Ayn Rand was a brilliant if amateur philosopher, but she had gumption galore. She believed that an Objectivist Ethics was knowable, and here she seems to allude to such on Page 18 of her book, The Virtue Of Selfishness: "In answer to those philosophers that claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact of living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of the ultimate value which for any living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between 'is' and 'ought.'"
In defiance of David Hume's skeptical, accepted assertion that we probably can know what its, but that cannot lead us to clear statements about what ought to be or objective moral truths, Rand the moral and epistemological dogmatist boldly disagreeing, proclaim the fact that the moral agent exist determines and directly reveals what he ought to do, so there is no residing mystery or puzzle at work here. I think she may have a point but so does Hume, so I withhold final judgment until I can study this more.
Rand continues: " Now in what manner does a human being discover the concept of 'value'? By what means does he first become aware of the issue of 'good or evil' in its simplest forms? By means of the physical sensations of pleasure or pain. Just as sensations are the first of the development of a human consciousness in the realm of cognition, so they are its first step in the realm of evaluation."
My response: our innate moral categories sensing what is good or evil, when we are not self-deceiving, when language and concept are assigned by us to these sense stimuli, both good and evil. I am uncomfortable with Rand's assigning to raw sensations of pleasure and pain. Such emotional/physio-chemical responses to what we experience might feed our cognitive structures, and allow us to evaluate whether such experiences , but these rough sentimental categories need to be compared and contrasted with our code of ethics too.
Rand continues: "The capacity to experience pleasure or pain is innate in a man's body; it is part of his nature, part of the kind of entity he is. He has no choice about it, and he has no choice about the standard that determines what will make him experience the physical sensation of pleasure or pain. What is that standard? His life."
My response: Rand seems to be striving for an Objectivist ethical code based upon the gold standard, centered in biology that the action is good or pleasurable or bad or painful, depending how each action improve or degrade his life. I do not yet know if I buy this, but will read carefully and much more, before deciding if biological states of sensing and then concluding and assigning value based on natural, pleasurable or painful response, does work. I like her reachjng for Objectivist ethics but I am not sure thig assertion that one's life is one's ultimate ethical stand holds under scrutiny. Maybe it does. It just seems too.simplistic, too mechanistic and too reductionistic.
Rand continues on Page 18 and 19: "The pleasure-pain mechanism in the body of man--and in the bodies of all living organisms--serves as an automatic guardian of the organism's life. The physical sensation of pleasure is a signal indicating that organism is pursuing the right course of action. The physical sensation of pain is a warning of danger, indicating the organism is pursuing the wrong course of action, that something is impairing the proper function of the body, which requires action to correct it. The best illustration of this can be seen in the rare, freak cases of children that are born without the capacity to feel physical pain; such children do not survive long; they have no means of discovering what can injure them, no warning signals, and thus a minor cut can remain undetected until it is too late to fight it."
My response: Like she is roughly correct that our instinctive feelings to any incoming stimulus, a feeling of pleasure or pain, might have survival value, but does that suffice to serve as the gold standard for evaluating all actions, some of which are subtle and complex. What pains us might be evil or it might be good that we feel pain (or guilt) if we would, for example, torture a cat. It might give us intense pleasure to play the sadistic child and torture a cat, but that pleasure would be evil. Rand might be able to ground her Objectivist ethics on the perception of natural felt reactions to any incoming sensation, labeling the painful or pleasurable reaction to each specific sensation as respectively evil or good, but I am trouble by it.
My response: our innate moral categories sensing what is good or evil, when we are not self-deceiving, when language and concept are assigned by us to these sense stimuli, both good and evil. I am uncomfortable with Rand's assigning to raw sensations of pleasure and pain. Such emotional/phsyio-chemical responses to what we experience might feed our cognitive structures, and allow us to evaluate whether such experiences , but these rough sentimental categories need to be compared and contrasted with our code of ethics too.
Rand contiues: "The capacity to experience pleasure or pain is innate in a man's body; it is part of his nature, part of the kind of entity he is. He has no choice about it, and he has no choice about the standard that determines what will make him experience the physical sensation of pleasure or pain. What is that standard? His life."
My response: Rand seems to be striving for an objectivst ethical code based upon the gold standard, centered in biology that the action is good or pleasurable or bad or painful, depending how each action improve or degrade his life. I do not yet know if I buy this, but will listen much more before deciding if biological states of sensing snf concluding work. I like her reacjg fr objectivsti ethics bt I am not sure thig assertion that one's life is one's ultimate ethical stand ard works. Maybe it does. It just seems too.simplistic, mechanistic and too reductionistic.
Rand continueson Page 18 and 19: "The pleasure-pain mechanism in the body of man--and in the bodies of all living organisms--serves as an automatic guardian of the organism's life. The physical sensation of pleasure is a signal indicating that organism is pursuing the right course of action. The physical sensation of pain is a warning of danger, indicating the the organism is pursuing the wrong course of action, that something is impairing the proper function of the body, which requires action to correct it. The best illustration of this can be seen in the rare, freak cases of children that are born without the capacity to feel physical pain; such children do not survive long; they have no means of discovering what can injure them, no warning signals, and thus a minor cut can remain undetected until it is too late to fight it."
My response: Like she is roughly correct that our instinctive feelings to any incoming stimulus, a feeling of pleasure or pain, mgiht have survival value, but does that suffice to serve as the elgal standard for evaluating all actions, some of which aresubtle and complex. What pains us might be evil or it might be good that we feel pain (or guilt) if we would torture a cat. It might give us intense pleasure to play the sadistic child and torture a cat, but that pleasure would be evil. Rand might be able to ground her Objectivist ethics on the hat of natural felt reactions to any incoming sensation, labeling the painful or pleasurable reaction to each spefic sensation as respectively evil or good, but I am trouble by it.
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