Internet Encyclopedia

 

Today is 11/30/2023: I downloaded 17-page article from the Internet Encyclopedia on the Omnipotence Paradox. Kenneth L. Pearce, philosophy professor, wrote this article.

It is too lengthy to quote from totally, but I will cherry pick what interests me and comment on what I quote. The title of the article is Omnipotence.

 

Pearce (P after this): “Omnipotence is the property of being all-powerful; it is one of the traditional divine attributes in Western concepts of God. This notion of an all-powerful being is often claimed to be incoherent because a being who has the power to do anything would, for instance, have the power to draw a round square. A common response to this objection is to assert that defenders of divine omnipotence never intended to claim that God could bring about logical absurdities. This observation about what is not meant by omnipotence does little, however, to clarify just what is meant by the term. Philosophers have therefore attempted to state necessary and sufficient conditions for omnipotence.”

 

My response: God occasionally may or may have to bring about logical absurdities that reflect on De’s omnipotence not one whit. Still, De is loath to contravene the law of contradiction and settled natural law, unless at times of utmost peril or need.

 

My defense of God’s reputation requires that I support belief in De’s (De is my pronoun for either of the married couple, God the Father or God the Mother.) possessing the divine attribute of being all-powerful, or nearly all-powerful. It may be incoherent to believe in God’s omnipotence and yet agree that most of the time, God cannot or will not draw a round square.

 

This moderate theology of mine may be incoherent because I contradict myself, because infinite attributes are not linguistically able to be characterized by humans, or because some inconsistency in God’s nature or action may be, ironically a demonstration of God’s omnipotency unfolding, but not quite understandable for us.

 

We can declare that God will and can do anything—even contradictory things at times--because so acting is possible for God. There may be a rare time, for some transcendent reason that God does evil. Still, most always God could but refuses to do evil, be contradictory or silly, all detracting from God’s conducted goodness in line with what is logical and lawful.

 

P: “These proposed analyses are evaluated by several criteria. First, it must be determined whether the property described by the analysis captures what the theologians and ordinary religious believers mean when they describe God as omnipotent, almighty, and all-powerful. Omnipotence is thought to be quite an impressive property. Indeed, the traditional God’s omnipotence is one of the attributes that makes him worthy of worship. If, therefore, an analysis implies that certain conceivable beings who are not impressive with respect to their power counter as omnipotent, then the analysis is inadequate.

 

Second, when a particular analysis does seem to be in line with the ordinary use of the term, the next question is whether the property described is self-consistent. For instance, many proposed analyses of omnipotence give inconsistent answers to the question of whether an omnipotent being could create a stone too heavy to lift.”

 

My response: My moderate theology is built on inconsistent answers to my definition of God’s omnipotence will not be completely self-consistent, but that is how the world works, I posit.

 

P: “Third, it is necessary to determine whether omnipotence, so understood, could form part of a coherent total religious view. Some analyses of omnipotence require that an omnipotent being be able to do evil, or to break promises, but God has been traditionally regarded as unable to do these things.”

 

My response: My moderate theology would regard God as mostly powerful and a little bit powerless, and that God could draw a round square, but refuses to, and usually does not do evil, deny Deself, or break promises. I think this is a mixed, but coherent, total religious view reflecting the complexity of the world.. It is not the traditional Western religious take on God.

 

P: “It has also been argued that the existence of an omnipotent being  would be inconsistent with human freedom. Finally, divine omnipotence is one of the premises leading to the alleged contradiction in traditional religious belief known as the Logical Problem of Evil.

 

A successful analysis of omnipotence is one which captures the ordinary notion, is free from internal contradiction, and is compatible with other elements of the religious view in which it is embedded . . . “

 

My response:  I will not tackle the Logical Problem of Evil here, and no moderate theologian, especially one as quirky as I am, would dare predict that my analysis of omnipotence would guarantee then my analysis was not rife with internal contradiction, but that this recognition would be laid out in a coherent and existentially accurate manner, reflecting how the world works.

 

P: “1. The Self-Consistency of Omnipotence.

 

A.    The Stone Paradox

 

Could an omnipotent being create a stone too heavy for it to lift? More generally, could an omnipotent being make something it could not control (Mackiev1955: 210)? This question is known as the Paradox of Stone, or the Paradox of Omnipotence. It appears that answering either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ will mean the being in question is not omnipotent after all. For suppose that the being cannot create the stone. Then it seems that it is not omnipotent, for there is something that it cannot do. But suppose the being can create the stone. Then, again, there is something it cannot do, namely, lift a stone that it has created.”

 

My response: Pearce is such a clear thinker and writer: it is a joy to follow his analysis. If answer yes or no to the posed paradox leads to “proof” that God is not omnipotent, the theist must answer with defeat, with conquered silence,  with yes and no at the same time (Which sort of is my moderate answer which may be construed as changing, illogical, contradictory nonsense, but I hope to justify it.), or some yes or no answer that Pearce is going to offer below that resolves the paradox consistently and coherently.

 

P: “Although the argument usually initially stated in this form, as it stands it is not quite valid. From the fact that a particular being is able to create a stone that it cannot lift, it does not follow that there is in fact something that that being cannot do. It only follows that if the being were to create the stone, then there would be something it could not do. As a result, the paradox is a problem only for necessary omnitemporal omnipotence, that is, for the view that there is a being that exists necessarily and is necessarily omnipotent at every time (Swinburne 1973; Meierding:1980). There is no problem for a being who is only omnipotent at certain times, because the being in question might very well be omnipotent prior to creating the stone (but not after). Furthermore, the stone paradox provides no reason to suppose there could not be a contingently omnitemporally omnipotent being; all the being in question would need to do is to decide not to create the stone, and then it would be omnipotent at every time. Nevertheless, the Stone Paradox is on interest because necessarily omnitemporal omnipotence has traditionally been attributed to God.”

 

My response: It could be that the ebb and flow on universal processes and stages might require omnitemporal omnipotence God to give up omnipotence periodically to create a round square, with full knowledge that, once, some universal imbalance was righted, God would resume being omnipotent all the time, or until the next occasion arose, where God would give up for a time being omnipotent, to draw a square circle again once more for the good of the world. This supreme self-sacrifice may be what God wills to do, so must undertake, and will undertake to restore imbalance or repair a tear or flaw in the fabric of existence.

 

Or it could be that God is omnitemporally omnipotent all the time, necessarily, and that logical or metaphysical absurdities like the atheist’s or skeptic’s challenge for God to draw a round square immediately, or deny that De is omnipotent, are trifling distractions without merit, unworthy for secure omnipotent God to heed, let alone demonstrate. God has nothing to prove to those that would use logical absurdities to attempt to undercut God as flawed, imperfect, absurd or unable to exist as a contradiction, so God does not even exist, if they can prove that God is self-contradictory.

 

P: “The Stone Paradox is the main focus of those attempting to specify exactly what an omnipotent being could, and could not, do. However, even for those who do not wish to insist on necessary omnitemporal omnipotence, a number of questions arise. Could an omnipotent being draw a square circle? Descartes notoriously answered ‘yes.’ However, the Western philosophical and theological traditions have, at least since Aquinas, almost universally given the opposite answer. The view that an omnipotent being could do absolutely anything, even the logically absurd, is known as voluntarism.”

 

My response: I the moderate theologian would generally agree with Aquinas that there are some things that God cannot do (or will not do, even with his divine free will to choose to do other than what De does): evil, logical absurdities, contradictory acts. That is God most of the time, but there may be other times, a minority of times, that the voluntarist view is correct, that God can do absolutely anything, and still be omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent.

 

P: “Simply rejecting voluntarism does not give an answer to the Stone Paradox. Creating a stone too heavy for its creator to lift is a possible task. Another possible task which an omnipotent being apparently cannot perform is coming to know that one has never been omnipotent. For human beings, this is a fairly simple task, but for an omnipotent being it would seem to be impossible. The general problem is this: The fact that it is logically possible that some being perform a specified task (if the fact itself does not contain a contradiction) does not guarantee that it is logically possible for an omnipotent being to perform that task. Coming to know that one has never been omnipotent is an example of a single task that is logically possible for some being to perform, but which is logically impossible for some omnipotent to perform. The Stone Paradox provides an example of two tasks (creating a stone its creator cannot life and lifting the stone one has just created) such that each task is logically possible, but it is logically impossible for one task to be performed immediately after the other.

 

In order to meet these challenges, it is necessary to say something more precise than to simply affirm that an omnipotent being would be able to do whatever is possible. These more precise theories  can be divided into two classes: act theories, which say an omnipotent being would be able to perform any action; and result theories, which say that an omnipotent being would be able to bring about any result.”

 

My response: I suppose an omnipotent being could perform any action, but most likely would not to not deny Deself, and perhaps De has the power to bring about any result, like the Devil ruling earth for another million years, but God would not do this. Perhaps, like Descartes, we have to allow God to remain omnipotent while conducting occasional logical absurdities, but that does not seem comforting for believers or skeptics.

 

P: “Rene Descartes, almost alone in the tradition of Western theology, held that God could do anything, even affirming that ‘God could have brought it about . . . that it was not true that twice four made eight’ (Descartes 1984-1991: 2:294).”

 

My response: I am beginning to think Descartes (I am not claiming this for sure.) was a logical moderate and a ontological moderate like I am. If a self-contradictory God, can be omnipotent and not omnipotent at the same that, and  can draw a round square or make 2 x 4=9—De has the power to do both--then God runs a world where drawing a round square of logically impossible, and yet somehow under super-logic (God’s transcendent logic), it is logically possible.

 

Not only does God do the logically impossible, but God can be self-contradictory and draw a round square in actuality; thus, God can self-contradictory logically and also self-contradict as a living Omnipotent creator of the universe. The actually impossible is one of God’s powers, the Existent, the Almighty Agent can self-contradict.

 

I and Descartes seem to be saying that God is omnipotent and can draw a round square, and that power is logically possible and metaphysically, biologically, socially, spiritually, physically possible.

 

God as Logos is the divine or spiritual principle of creativity and maintenance that crafted and operates natural laws that run reality. Therefore, logical laws, logical possibilities and logical impossibilities can occur in the supernatural and natural world. Therefore, laws governing reality, ontological consistent possibilities, and contradictory possibilities and contradictory impossibilities occur in both the spiritual and physical realm.

 

Because there are true contradictions logically possible and possible in reality (both in the spiritual and physical domains), the moderate logician (Descartes, Graham Priest and I) would likely suggest that most of the time, self-contradiction and other-contradiction are logically and realistically impossibilities, but at times—not often to be sure--self-contradiction and other-contradiction are logical and realistic possibilities.

 

P: “If this doctrine is adopted, then the Stone Paradox is dissolved: If an omnipotent being could make contradictions true, then an omnipotent being could make a stone too heavy for it to lift and still lift it (Frankfurt 1964). However, this doctrine is of questionable coherence. To cite one difficulty, it would seem to follow from the claim that God could make 2 x 4=9 that possibly God makes 2 x 4=9. However, it is a necessary truth that if God makes 2 x 4=9, the 2 x 4=9. In standard modal logics, possibly p and necessarily if p then q entail possibly q, so it seems to follow that possibly 2 x 4-9.

 

Descartes does not accept this consequence, but it is not clear how he can avoid it. It has been suggested that he may be implicitly to the rejection of one or more widely accepted modal axioms (Curley 1984). These sorts of absurdities have led to the nearly universal rejection of voluntarism by philosophers and theologians.”

 

My response: I have to focus here by not searching out what voluntarism means, but my ontology and logic of moderation might well fit under that category of voluntarism, universally rejected by theologians and philosophers. It could be that they are ontological and logical monists: the law of noncontradiction holds logically and actually, and ideas like God drawing a square circle while remaining omnipotent could never happen, and that the very concept, they insist, is logical nonsense, logically impossible nonsense.

 

P: “c. Act Theories

 

Once voluntarism is rejected, it is necessary to specify more precisely what is meant by saying that an omnipotent being could do anything. One natural way of doing this is to give a definition of the form:

 

S is omnipotent=dfS can perform any action A such that C where C specifies some conditions A must satisfy. Such theories of omnipotence may be conveniently referred to as act theories. The simplest (non-voluntarist) act theory is:

 

(1)   S is omnipotent=dfS can perform any action A such that A is possible

 

 

This act theory deals with the problem of drawing a round square and make 2 x 4=9: these are not possible actions. There is some difficulty in saying which acts could count as possible, and this threatens to make the condition too weak. For instance, a being who could perform only physically possible actions would not be omnipotent. The usual response, dating back at least to Aquinas, is to say that an action is possible, in the relevant sense, if and only if it is consistent, that is, if it is not self-contradictory.” 

 

My response: I believe an omnipotent being can do most anything occasionally, but cannot do anything most of the time, and still remain omnipotent and not denying Deself, undercutting De’s Logos at work in logic and reality as written and utilized natural law.

 

I am no symbolically trained logician, so Pearce’s demonstrated formal theorem representing act theory to disprove voluntarism is not something I understand or can comment on. I think a deity could be omnipotent by performing any possible or impossible physical action whether it is consistent or inconsistent, self-contradictory or not.

 

P:  “The Stone Paradox is most effective against act theories. Making a stone one cannot lift is a possible action, so, in order to count as omnipotent according to (1), a being must be able to perform it. However, if any being performs this task, then the is a possible task which that being cannot perform immediately afterward, namely, lifting the stone it has just made. It might be objected that this task is not possible for the being in question, but this qualification is not permitted by (1). Definition (1) requires that an omnipotent being should be able to perform any logically possible action, that is, any action which could be possibly be performed by any being at all, in any circumstances at all. It is clearly possible that some being perform lifting the stone one has just made, so, according to (1), a being who had just performed the action making a stone one cannot lift could not possibly be omnipotent.

 

My response: Again, I do not know act theory, so this paragraph is one I cannot comment on.

 

P: “This is not a problem for a being who is only contingently omnipotent: such a being might perform the first task, thereby ceasing to be omnipotent, and so unable to perform the second task, or the being might refrain from performing the first task, and so continue to be omnipotent. However, the Paradox does show that on the contemplated theory no being could necessarily omnitemporally omnipotent.”

 

My response: Pearce accepts that under act theory the Paradox shows that no being could be necessarily omnitemporarlly omnipotent. I am not sure any restriction applies to God in every instance.

 

P: “It has sometimes been thought that this problem could be solved simply by recognizing that creating a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift is an impossible action, and therefore an omnipotent being need not be able to perform it (Mavrodes 1963). However, this line of objection fails to recognize that, in addition to the impossible action creating a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift, there are also such possible actions as crating a stone one cannot lift and creating a stone the creator cannot lift.

 

There are further problems. Possible actions also include coming to know that one has never been omnipotent, which, since no one can know falsehoods, no omnipotent being could do. Additionally, this kind of view causes problems for various traditional religious views, such as the assertion by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews that it is ‘impossible for God to lie’ (Hebrews 6:18) since lying is a possible action.”

 

My response: Pearce is rejecting Mavrodes’s claim that the omnipotence paradox can be defeated by such action being logically impossible, so God would not perform it.

 

P: “Medieval philosophers prior to Aquinas often attempted to deal with this problem by claiming that an omnipotent being could perform any action which does not require a defect or infirmity. However, there was very little success in spelling out the meaning of this assertion (Ross 1969:196-202). Here is a definition which captures the basic idea of these Medieval analyses:

 

(2)   S is omnipotent =dfS can perform any action A such that it is logically possible that S does A.

 

This is similar to the Medieval suggestion since, according to classical theology, God is necessarily without defect or infirmity, so that, if the action A requires a defect or infirmity, (2) does not require that God, in order to count as omnipotent, should be able to do it. However (2) into the famous ‘McEar’ counter-example (Plantinga 1967: 170; La Croix 1977: 183). Suppose that it is a necessary truth about a certain being, known as McEar, that the only action he performs  is scratching his ear. It follows that, if McEar can scratch his ear, he is omnipotent, despite his inability to do anything else. This result is clearly unacceptable.”

 

My response: Again, I cannot follow this argument because I do not understand (2) set theory proposition, but it seems that Pearce discount the medievalist thinking that God could perform any action consistent with God’s being perfect and without defect, and that this condition defines God’s omnipotent state. This medieval defense of God omnipotency sees appealing to me but Pearce seems to be arguing that defective attributes, attachable to God, fly in the face of God’s being omnipotent by being perfect.

 

P: “One response, considered by Alvin Plantinga and advocated by Richard La Croix, is to claim merely than an otherwise God-like being who satisfied this definition would be omnipotent. If the concept of God is otherwise coherent, then this claim is probably true. It also has the benefit of being guaranteed not to create any inconsistencies, for it is built into the definition that God has power only to perform those actions such as it is possible for him to perform them. However, to adopt this strategy is to give up on the project of providing a general analysis of omnipotence. Furthermore, this claim, on its own, does not answer the question of the Stone Paradox: is it possible for God to create a stone he cannot lift?

 

Although, not everyone agrees that La Croix’s response is satisfactory, it is widely held that the prospects are not good for a consistent general definition or analysis of omnipotence in terms of acts (Ross 1969: 202-210; Geach 1973; Swinburne 1973; Sobel 2004: ch, 9).”

 

d. Result Theories

 

The main alternatives to act theories of omnipotence are result theories, theories which analyze omnipotence in terms of the results an omnipotent being would be able to bring about. These results are usually thought of as states of affairs or possible worlds. A possible state of affairs is the way the world could be. Philosophers also recognize impossible states of affairs, that is, ways the world cannot be. For instance, the sky’s being blue is a possible state of affairs, and John’s being a married bachelor is an impossible state or affairs. A possible world is a maximal consistent state of affairs, a complete way the world could be.

 

My response:  Pearce finds act theories (God can perform any action: be they self-contradictory, logically absurd, consistent and logical) to be wanting.

 

I will wait and see what he says about result theories of omnipotence (God can bring about any result) but he will likely find them wanting to.

 

I would suggest that God can perform any action and get any result, logically and in reality, some of the time, but that God loves order and cosmos, so most of the time God will perform such acts and get such results that are consistent, logical and possible logically and ontology.

 

P: “Equivalent, or approximately equivalent, result theories can be stated in terms either of states of affairs or possible worlds. The simplest (non-voluntarist) result theory can be stated, in terms of possible worlds, as follows:

 

(3)   S is omnipotent =dfS can bring about any possible world.”

 

My response: The logical symbol =df, the source of which I cannot find online, appears to mean is equal to by definition to . Let me translate (3). S is omnipotent is equal by definition under result theory to saying S can bring about any possible world.

 

God as omnipotent would be able to do anything doable in any possible world, a world of monistic consistency logically and ontologically, not violating the law of contradiction.

 

P: “In other words for any comprehensive way the world could be, an omnipotent being could bring it about that the world was that way. This account of omnipotence was first clearly laid out and endorsed by Leibniz, who pioneered the philosophical use of a notion of possible world (Liebniz 1985: sects. 87-8, 52,416). More recently, James Ross has advocated a similar account, though Ross prefers a formulation in terms of states of affairs (Ross 1969: 210-213).

 

(4)   S is omnipotent =df for every contingent state of affairs p, whether p is the case is logically equivalent to the effective choice, by S, that p”

 

My response: (4) S is omnipotent is equivalent by definition to for every contingent state of affairs p, whether p is the case is logically equivalent to the effective choice, by S, that p.

 

P: “Since every state of affairs must either obtain or not, and since two contradictory states of affairs cannot both obtain, an omnipotent being, would have to will some maximal consistent set of contingent state of affairs (Ross: 1980:614), that is, some one possible world. Ross’s definition therefore entails Leibniz’s.”

 

My response: To make it axiomatic that every state of affairs must obtain or not Ross is positing that the law of noncontradiction holds sway in the realm of logic and out in the world. God’s willed acts must result in some maximal consistent state of affairs.

 

P: “The Leibniz-Ross theory neatly handles all the objections raised against act theories. First, the Stone Paradox depends on the existence of reflexive actions, that is, actions whose descriptions refer back to the actor. Although states of affairs can refer to agents, a state of affairs does not have an actor. Thus, the phrase ‘there being a stone one cannot lift’ fails to specify a state of affairs, since there is no actor for ‘one’ to refer to. In order to specify a state of affairs, it is necessary to replace ‘one’ with some expression that defines which agent or agents cannot lift the stone. However, there being a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift is clearly not a possible state of affairs. An omnipotent being could therefore not bring it about. On the other hand, there being a stone its creator cannot lift is a possible state of affairs, and could be brought about by an omnipotent being, under the Leibniz theory, for an omnipotent being could bring it about that some other being created a stone which that being could not lift. Therefore, the Stone Paradox is not a problem for the Leibniz-Ross theory.

 

While there are no obvious contradictions involved in the Leibniz-Ross theory, there are a number of metaphysical consequences which some have thought odd and, indeed, absurd. First, the Leibniz-Ross theory implies that an omnipotent being exists necessarily. According to Leibniz’s formulation, an omnipotent being would be able to actualize any possible world, it  would be absurd to suppose that an omnipotent being should actualize a world in which it never existed. It follows that no such world is possible. On Ross’s formulation, the obtaining of any state of affairs is logically equivalent to its being chosen by an omnipotent being. Therefore, the obtaining of a state of affairs of no omnipotent being ever existing is logically equivalent to an omnipotent being effectively choosing that no omnipotent being should ever exist, but if no omnipotent being ever exists, then no omnipotent being ever chooses. As a result, the state of affairs on no omnipotent being ever existing cannot possibly obtain (Ross 1969:213-214). Leibniz and Ross are both proponents of the ontological argument for the existence of God, so they both regard this as a benefit of this theory of omnipotence. Other have, however, found it implausible.”

 

My response: This all seems highly speculative, but I like Leibniz’s take that an omnipotent being exists necessarily and would not create a world in which De did not exist.

 

 

P: “Although many people find it intuitive to suppose that there are possible worlds in which there is no omnipotent being, the Leibniz-Ross theory of omnipotence rules out this possibility. The Leibniz-Ross theory may narrow the space of possible worlds even further, for God, the being Leibniz and Ross believe to be omnipotent, is also supposed to be morally perfect, and there are worlds which intuitively seem possible which a necessarily morally perfect being could not, it seems, create—for instance, worlds in which the only sentient creatures suffer excruciating pain throughout every moment of their existence. On the Leibniz-Ross theory, if the omnipotent being could not create these worlds, then these worlds are not possible.

 

Furthermore, the Leibniz-Ross theory entails that an omnipotent being not only cannot create beings it cannot control, but cannot create beings it does not control (Mann 1977). In the Leibniz-ross theory, an omnipotent being must choose every state of affairs which is to obtain, including all the choices of its creatures. This is often thought to be a serious threat to human freedom.”

 

My response: I did not realize Leibniz was anti-free will; that is unacceptable.

 

P: “All these concerns with the Leibniz-Ross theory point the same direction: the suggestion that there are logically possible states of affairs which it is nevertheless logically impossible that an omnipotent being, or an omnipotent being who also has the other traditional divine attributes, should actualize. This line of reasoning has led Plantinga to dub the view that God can actualize any possible world ‘Leibniz Lapse (Plantinga 1974: 180-184).

 

There is disagreement about exactly which, or how many, possible states of affairs cannot possibly be brought about by an omnipotent being. For instance, philosophers disagree about whether the claim that an omnipotent being exists is necessarily true, necessarily false, or contingent. If it is a contingent matter whether an omnipotent being exists, then the state of affairs of no omnipotent being ever existing is possible, but nevertheless cannot possibly be brought about by an omnipotent being. Perhaps the most widely accepted examples, and those Plantinga focuses on, are statements about free choices of creatures. Plantinga believes it is logically impossible that any being other than Caesar should bring about the possible state of affairs such as Caesar’s freely choosing not to cross the Rubicon, for if Caesar’s not crossing the Rubicon had been brought about by some other being (for example, God), then Caesar would not have freely chosen.

 

If it is accepted that there are some possible states of affairs which it is impossible that an omnipotent being should bring about, a more complicated analysis of omnipotence is needed. An obvious candidate is:

 

(5)   S is omnipotent =df if S is equivalent by definition to S can bring about any state of affairs p such that it is logically possible that it is logically possible that S brings about p

 

However, this brings back the McEar objection, which the Leibniz-Ross theory had escaped. It is essential to McEar that he never bring about anything than his own scratching of his ear. It is therefore impossible that McEar bring about some other state of affairs. As a result, this definition, once again wrongly counts McEar as omnipotent, provided only that he is able to scratch his ear. Some philosophers have responded by arguing that there could not possibly be such a being as McEar (Wierenga 1983:374-375). Others have given up on the project of giving a general analysis of omnipotence (La Croix 1977). Still others have advocated theories of omnipotence which make special accommodation to creaturely freedom (Flint and Freddoso 1983).

 

An entirely different approach to the problem is advocated by Erik J. Wielenberg (2000). According to Wielenberg, omnipotence cannot be analyzed simply by consideration of which state of affairs an omnipotent being could or could not bring about.  Instead, it is necessary to consider why the being could or could not bring them about. Wielenberg proposes the following analysis:

 

(6)   S is omnipotent =df is equivalent by definition to there is no state of affair p such that S is unable to bring about p at least partially due to a lack of of power

 

This analysis avoids attributing omnipotence to McEar since McEar’s limitation seems to be at least in part due to lack of power. It also solves the problem of the consistency of God’s inability to do evil with omnipotence, since God’s inability to do evil is not due to a lack of power. Finally, according to Wielenberg, if it is really true that even an omnipotent being could not bring about Caesar’s freely choosing not to cross the Rubicon, then this must not be due to a lack of power, but to the logic of the situation. The chief limitation of Wielenberg’s account is that it makes use of some unanalyzed notions whose analysis philosophers have found quite difficult. These are notions of lack of power and the notion of one state of affairs obtaining partially due to another state of affairs obtaining. Without analyses of these notions, it is hard to tell whether Wielenberg’s analysis is self-consistent and whether it is consistent with other traditional divine attributes.

 

e. Omnipotence and Time

 

The Leibniz-Ross theory entails that the exercise of omnipotent power cannot occur within time. This is because, in this view, to exercise omnipotent power is to choose some particular possible world to be actual. To think of such a choice as occurring in time would be to imagine that some possible world, could, at some particular time, become actual, having previously been merely possible. This, however, is absurd (Ross 1080: 621). Therefore, on the Leibniz-Ross theory, an omnipotent being can only act atemporally.

 

My response: it seems to me that an omnipotent being would act within time and outside of time too.

 

P: “The notion of an atemporal action has, however, been found difficult. To give just one example of such a difficulty, it is widely held that acting requires one to be the cause of certain effects. However, many philosophers have also held that it is part of the concept of a cause that must occur before its effects. Since something atemporal is neither before nor after anything else, there cannot be an atemporal cause, and, therefore , there cannot be an atemporal action.

 

On the other hand, even apart from the Leibniz-Ross theory, there are difficulties with the notion  of being omnipotent at a time. This is because there are contingent states of affairs about the past, but the notion of changing the past is generally agreed to be incoherent (see Time Travel). Thus omnipotence at a point in time cannot be defined as , for instance, the ability to bring about any contingent state of affairs because, although many past states of affairs are contingent, nothing done in the present, even by an omnipotent being, could possibly bring about a past state of affairs . . .”

 

My response: God could miraculously change the past if De wanted too, but mostly would not alter what has occurred.